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The Past of Communication's 
Hoped-For Future 
by Klaus Krippendorff, University of Pennsylvania 
In this essay I am suggesting that much of communication scholarship to 
date has been message driven and that this dominant form of explaining 
what communication is or does is slowly being challenged by what one 
may call reflexive explanations. This discursive perturbation offers re­
searchers the choice of either narrowing their domain of inquiry to where 
mt!ssage-driven explanations can be enforced, or embarking on an excit­
ing path of reconstructing our field. 
Let me begin by stating what I see as three defining features of mes­
sage-driven explanations and then consider some of their fruits. 
First, messages are objectively describable compositions, texts, or 
events. They are created to be moveable from one physical location or 
context to another or reprod11cible at different places or times. They thus 
exist in an objective reality and indept!ndent of anyone receiving them. 
References to intertextuality, message systems, or situational structures 
do not substantially alter the subject-independence of this starting point 
of message-driven explanations. 
Second, messages affect, persuade, inform, stimulate, or arouse those 
exposed to them. Whatever messages caust! or bring to their receivers, 
their contents, the symbolic qualities they have, are believed carried in 
their composition or structure and must therefore be explained or be the­
orized as afu11ctio11 of these objective properties. Cognition is simplified 
to a linear process of responding to or interpreting given mes.,age-.. 
Third, expos11re lo the same messages causes commo1wlities among 
senders and receivers, and, in the case of the mass media, among audi9 
ence members. This gives "communication" its social significance and a 
standard for evaluating its success. So, deviations from expected com­
monalities become individual failures, misinterpretations, ideological or 
cognitive biases, noise, systemic distortions, and so on. 
Thus, message-driven explanations are both objeclivisl and implicitly 
IIOr/1Ultive. 
Klaus Krippcndorff is a professor ;H the i\nncnbcrg Sd1ool for Communication, University 
of Pennsylvania. 
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The End of Theories We Grew Up With 
Message-driven explanations have ancient roots-for example, in the 
rhetoricians' search for linguistic forms that make arguments compelling. 
Their modern incarnation comes from journalism. Journalists see them­
selves as writing newspapers and magazines that were created to be mass 
produced and imiformly comprehensible to their readers. When new 
media such as radio and TV came along, and when interpersonal encoun­
ters, political events, and organizational processes came to be seen as 
communication as well, the printed message quickly became the domi­
nant metaphor for conceptualizing them. The fact that discrete messages 
were not so obviously, if at all, identifiable in these new media; that dif­
ferences in interpersonal skills, accessability, and authority had no place 
in these explanations; and that definitions of community or of a public 
based on common exposure to messages became empirically untenable, 
did not prevent communication researchers from refining message-driven 
explanations. 
In fact, Lasswell (1948) codified the field, its research questions and ex­
planations, by defining communication research as providing answers to 
the five questions: "Who, says what, in which channel, to whom, and 
with what effects." To date, his formula defines many communication re­
search designs. In the same year, Berelson and Lazarsfeld 0948) finished 
their conception of content analysis as an uobjective, systematic, and 
quantitative description of the manifest content of communication,"
. 
promising scientific accounts of what messages carry to everyone with ac­
cess to them. Also in 1948, Shannon (Shannon & Weaver, 1949) first pub­
lished A Mathematical Theory of Communication. Many communication 
rese.irchers immediately embraced his terminology, probably for the sci­
entific legitimacy a mathematically founded concept accorded to inquiries 
into communication, including the mass media (Schramm, 1954, 1955). 
However, only Shannon's diagram and Weaver's popular commentary on 
the theory entered the bulk of communications literature. Although the 
theory extended our vocabulary-adding such terms as redundancy and 
the encoding and decoding of messages-Shannon's statistical and rela­
tivist measure of information quickly became equated with news, or the 
stuff that messages "objectively" contain. After these basic notions were 
in place, message-driven explanations mushroomed. Without reviewing 
the many and more increasingly sophisticated versions of message-driven 
explanations that developed from these early beginnings, let me simply 
suggest that they now permeate the examplars in our field: studies corre­
lating message variables and effects, inquiries into the effectiveness of 
different message designs, use of mathematical theories to predict atti­
tude changes from media exposure, and so forth. None of these regard 
the human participants in the progress as capable of making up their own 
meanings, negotiating relationships among themselves, and reflecting on 
their own realitit!s. 
The Past of Communication's 
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In this essay I am suggesting that much of communication scholarship to 
date has been message driven and chat this dominant form of explaining 
what communication is or doe<; is slowly being challenged by what one 
may call reflexive explanations. This discursive perturbation offers re­
searchers the choice of either narrowing their domain of inquiry to where 
message-driven explanations can be enforced, or embarking on an excit­
ing path of reconstructing our field. 
Let me begin by stating what I see as three defining features of mes­
sage-driven explanations and then consider some of their fruits. 
First, messages arc objectively describable compositions, texts, or 
events. They are created to be moveable from one physical location or 
context to another or reproducible at different places or times. They thus 
exist in an objective reality and independent of anyone receiving them. 
References to intertextuality, message systems, or situational structures 
do not substantially alter the subject-independence of this starting point 
of message-driven explanations. 
Second, messages affect, persuade, inform, stimulate, or arouse those 
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their composition or structure and mw,t therefore be explained or be the­
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ence members. This gives "communication" its social significance and a 
standard for evaluating its success. So, deviations from expected com­
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Thus, message-driven explanations are both objectivist and implicitly 
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The End of Theories We Grew Up With 
Message-driven explanations have ancient roots-for example, in the
_ 
rhetoricians' search for linguistic forms that make arguments compelling. 
Their modern incarnation comes from journalism. Journalists see them­
selves as writing newspapers and magazines that were created to be mass 
produced and uniformly comprehensible to their readers. When new 
media such as radio and TV came along, and when interpersonal encoun­
ters, political events, and organizational processes came to be seen as 
communication as well, the printed message quickly became the domi­
nant metaphor for conceptualizing them. The fact that discrete messages 
were not so obviously, if at all, identifiable in these new media; that dif­
ferences in interpenmnal skills, accessability, and authority had no place 
in these explanations; and that definitions of community or of a public 
based on common exposure to messages became empirically untenable, 
did not prevent communication researchers from refining message-driven 
explanations. 
In fact, Lasswell (1948) codified the field, its research questions and ex­
planations, by defining communication research as providing answers to 
the five questions: "Who, says what, in which channel, to whom, and 
with what effects." To date, his formula defines many communication re­
search designs. In the same year, Berelson and Lazarsfeld 0948) finished 
their conception of content analysis as an "objective, systematic, and 
quantitative description of the manifest content of communication,"
. 
promising scientific accounts of what messages carry to everyone with ac­
cess to them. Also in 1948, Shannon (Shannon & Weaver, 1949) first pub­
lished A Mathematical Theory of Communication. Many communication 
researchers immediately embraced his terminology, probably for the sci­
entific legitimacy a mathematically founded concept accorded to inquiries 
into communication, including the mass media (Schramm, 1954, 1955). 
However, only Shannon's diagram and Weaver's popular commentary on 
the theory entered the bulk of communications literature. Although the 
theory extended our vocabulary-adding such terms as redundancy and 
the encoding and decoding of messages-Shannon's statistical and rela­
tivist measure of information quickly became equated with news, or the 
stuff that messages "objectively" contain. After these basic notions were 
in place, message-driven explanations mushroomed. Without reviewing 
the many and more increasingly sophisticated versions of message-driven 
explanations that developed from these early beginnings, let me simply 
suggest that they now permeate the examplars in our field: studies corre­
lating message variables and effects, inquiries into the effectiveness of 
different message designs, use of mathematical theories to predict atti­
tude changes from media exposure, and so forth. None of these regard 
the human participants in the progress as capable of making up their own 
meanings, negotiating relationships among themselves, and renecting on 
their own realities. 
D<ji11i11g ,lfediu Studies 
Where message-driven conceptions of communication entered serious 
empirical tests, they turned out to be of limited explanatory value. For ex­
ample, Katz and Lazarsfeld 0955) found evidence that led them to re­
place the hypodermic needle conception of mass media effects with a 
two-step flow model. The first step involved exposure to the media and 
the second an informal opinion-creating process mediated by opinion 
leaders. Klapper's (1960) massive review of the effects literature conclud­
ed that the mass media had rather limited abilities to shape their audience 
members' lives. I-Iis conclusions were criticized because (a) his review 
was sponsored by the networks who, being under public scrutiny, had an 
interest in its outcome; and (b) industry would not continue to finance 
the mass media through its advertising without reasonable expectations 
of a return on its investment. A more likely explanation for Klapper's 
findings is that message-driven conceptions just don't work. Obviously, 
the effects researchers, their reviewer Klapper, and his critics' responses 
to the mass media and to each other could hardly be explained in causal 
terms. 
Faced with these apparent failures, scholars came up with new concep­
tions. In the beginning these conceptions appeared to be mere stopgap 
measures, designed to keep linear causal explanations in place. But they 
also provided the seeds for alternatives to the dominant accounting prac­
tices. Let me mention some of these. 
One is the uses mu/ gratificaliolls approach. This approach can be 
traced to propagand.t effects studies during World War II and to Berel­
son's (1949) study of what missing the newspaper meant during a strike 
in New York City. Inquiries into the social and psychological needs, 
sources of expectations, and gratifications derived from mass media at­
tendance led proponents Katz, Blumler, and Gurevitch (1974) to turn the 
message determinism the other way. How audience members used these 
messages was found to be far from uniformly distributed among audience 
members. There was no obvious message determinism of effects. 
Another and far further going approach can be seen in the informa­
tion-seeking paradigm (e.g., Donohew & Tipton, 1973). Here, "objective" 
contents of messages are largely irrelevant. Individuals are seen as active­
ly engaged in diverse information seeking, avoiding, and processing 
strategies, which turn out to be explainable in terms of their "image of re­
ality," their "goals, beliefs, and knowledge." Information no longer is ex­
plainable from the properties of message alone. Senders or producers no 
longer play the central role that message-driven explanations assigned to 
them. 
In organizational communication research, a so-called i11terprelive "P­
proc�cb (e.g., Putnam & Pacanowski, 1983) has become increasingly ap­
pealing. It centers on the way individuals make sense of their world 
through communicative behaviors, and it attempts to explain choices in 
terms of prevailing "organizational cultures" or working climates to which 
members of an organization come to be committed. It holds that mea11-
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ings are created mu/ negotiated, neither objectively given nor assignable 
by a scientific authority. Individual participation in a social network of in­
teraction, not the messages, become the explanatory basis of outcomes 
and effects. 
Probably the most productive demonstration of the not so minimal ef­
fects of mass communication is the reo;earch on the media's ability to cre­
ate issues and set agendas for public opinion and action (e.g., Mccombs 
& Shaw, 1972). Clearly, issues, agendas, and controversies exist neither 
outside language nor without political actors' understanding. They are 
part of the very public discourse within which mass media institutions 
and mass media audiences constitute themselves. Their reality resides i11 
tbe playing of a public game of, albeit unequal, participation. One aspect 
of this unequal participation has been theorized as the so-called "spiral of 
silence" (Noelle-Neumann, 1984), which adds to the setting of agendas 
participants' perception of each others' opinions on issues; it attempts to 
predict the emergence of certain political realities by processes analogous 
to self-fulfilling prophecies. 
Sources of Breakdown and Alternatives 
Actually, communication research is comparatively late in experiencing 
such breakdowns of message-driven explanations which, while still ram­
pant in public and everyday discourses, have been dismissed in other dis­
ciplines for different reasons. 
The breakdown of the popular notion of language as descriptive or 
representative of an objective world external to us and separate from lan­
guage has been slow in coming, but it now enters the study of communi­
cation at numerous not so obvious entry points. It started with the 
Wittgensteinian notion of language as a game people play, -was paralleled 
in the Whorfian hypothesis of li11guislic relativity, and has recently led to 
the search for more adequate accounts of meaning in terms of the cogui­
live scbemas underlying the understanding of linguistic constructions 
(Johnson, 1987; Lakoff, 1987). Here, the objectivism in message-driven 
explanations is quite explicitly and thoroughly discredited and replaced 
by an experientialist alternative. 
Social constr11clivists have shown that "facts�-from emotions to per­
sons, gender, language, and cultural institutions-are socially construct­
ed, in the sense of having been invented, perhaps a! a time no longer ac­
cessible to individual memories (Berger & Luckmann, 1966) or from 
behind the facade of political institutions (Edelman, 1977), now being ha­
bitually reproduced by its participants. Constructivists can be divided into 
three camps. The first maintains the belief in an observer-independent re­
ality relative to which constructions by the media and by ordinary people 
could be compared and verified. In the opinion research literature, Lipp­
man was an early proponent of this view. Boorstin 0964) still believes he 
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Where message-driven conceptions of communication entered serious 
empirical tests, they turned out to be of limited explanatory value. For ex­
ample, Katz and Lazarsfeld 0955) found evidence that led them to re­
place the hypodermic needle conception of mass media effects with a 
lwo-stepjlow model. The first step involved exposure to the media and 
the second an informal opinion-creating process mediated by opinion 
leaders. Klapper's 0960) massive review of the effects literature conclud­
ed that the mass media had rather limited abilities to shape their audience 
members' lives. His conclusions were criticized because (a) his review 
was sponsored by the networks who, being under public scrutiny, had an 
interest in its outcome; and (b) industry would not continue to finance 
the mass media through its advertising without reasonable expectations 
of a return on its investment. A more likely explanation for Klapper's 
findings is that message-driven conceptions just don't work. Obviously, 
the effects researchers, their reviewer Klapper, and his critics' responses 
to the mass media and to each other could hardly be explained in causal 
terms. 
Faced with these apparent failures, scholars came up with new concep­
tions. In the beginning these conceptions appeared to be mere stopgap 
measures, designed to keep linear causal explanations in place. But they 
also provided the seeds for alternatives to the dominant accounting prac­
tices. Let me mention some of these. 
One is the uses mul gratificalions approach. This approach can be 
traced to propaganda effects studies during World War II and to Berel­
son's 0949) study of what missing the newspaper meant during a strike 
in New York City. Inquiries into the social and psychological needs, 
sources of expectations, and gratifications derived from mass media at­
tendance led proponents Katz, Blumler, and Gurevitch 0974) to turn the 
message determinism the other way. How audience members used these 
messages was found to be far from uniformly distributed among audience 
members. There was no obvious message determinism of effects. 
Another and far further going approach can be seen in the infornw­
lion-seeking pc1radigm (e.g., Donohew & Tipton, 1973). Here, "objective" 
contents of messages are largely irrelevant. Individuals are seen as active­
ly engaged in diverse information seeking, avoiding, and processing 
strategies, which turn out to be explainable in terms of their "image of re­
ality," their "goals, beliefs, and knowledge." Information no longer is ex­
plainable from the properties of message alone. Senders or producers no 
longer play the central role that message-driven explanations assigned to 
them. 
In organizational communication research, a so-called interpretive ap­
proach (e.g., Putnam & Pacanowski, 1983) has become increasingly ap­
pealing. It centers on the way individuals make sense of their world 
through communicative behaviors, and it attempts to explain choices in 
terms of prevailing "organizational cultures" or working climates to which 
members of an organization come to be committed. It holds that mean-
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ings are created and negotiated, neither objectively given nor assignable 
by a scientific authority. Individual participation in a social network of in­
teraction, not the messages, become the explanatory basis of outcomes 
and effects. 
Probably the most productive demonstration of the not so minimal ef­
fects of mass communication is the research on the media's ability to cre­
ate issues and set agendas for public opinion and action (e.g., McCombs 
& Shaw, 1972). Clearly, issues, agendas, and controversies exist neither 
outside language nor without political actors' understanding. They are 
part of the very public discourse within which mass media institutions 
and mass media audiences constitute themselves. Their reality resides in 
the playing of a public game of, albeit unequal, participation. One aspect 
of this unequal participation has been theorized as the so-called "spiral of 
silence" (Noelle-Neumann, 1984), which adds to the setting of agendas 
participants' perception of each others' opinions on issues; it attempts to 
predict the emergence of certain political realities by processes analogous 
to self-fulfilling prophecies. 
Sources of Breakdown and Alternatives 
Actually, communication research is comparatively late in experiencing 
such breakdowns of message-driven explanations which, while still ram­
pant in public and everyday discourses, have been dismissed in other dis­
ciplines for different reasons. 
The breakdown of the popular notion of language as descriptive or 
representative of an objective world external to us and separate from lan­
guage has been slow in coming, but it now enters the study of communi­
cation at numerous not so obvious entry points. It started with the 
Wittgensteinian notion of language as a game people play, was paralleled 
in the Whorfian hypothesis of linguistic relativity, and has recently led to 
the search for more adequace accounts of meaning in terms of the coglli­
live schemas underlying the understanding of linguistic constructions 
(Johnson, 1987; Lakoff, 1987). Here, the objectivism in message-driven 
explanations is quite explicitly and thoroughly discredited and replaced 
by an experientialist alternative. 
Social constructivists have shown that Mfacts''-from emotions to per­
sons, gender, language, and cul!ural institutions-are socially construct­
ed, in the sense of having been invented, perhap'i at a time no longer ac­
cessible to individual memories (Berger & Luckmann, 1966) or from 
behind the facade of political institutions (Edelman, 1977), now being ha­
bitually reproduced by its participants. Constructivi'its can be divided into 
three camps. The first maintains the belief in an observer-independent re­
ality relative to which constructions by the media and by ordinary people 
could be compared and verified. In the opinion research literature, Lipp­
man was an early proponent of this view. Boorstin O 964) still believes he 
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can distinguish pseudo-events from real ones. Tuchman 0974) considers 
news as constructed by the way the mass media are organized, and Gitlin 
0979) demonstrates how hegemonic processes account for TV entertain­
ment. Efforts to deconstruct social phenomena by showing how real so­
cial institutions, hegemonic forces, and power structures are responsible 
for them belong here as well. This approach-some call it trivial co11-
stmctivism-is unable to take institutions, structures of domination, ide­
ologies, and so forth, including the reality referred to in explaining these 
phenomena, as the analysts' constructions. 
The second group, the social co11struclio11ists, tie themselves to the 
later Wittgenstein and subsequent natural language philosophers by argu­
ing that all social phenomena can be explained by reference to language. 
Foucault (e.g., 1989) exemplifies a grand semiotic version of this view. 
Gergen (1985), his collaborators, and several discourse analysts-few of 
which build on Foucault's work-have shown how persons, emotions, 
gender, (self-)identity, taboos, and so forth are constructed and negotiat­
ed in language. They see no need co refer to facts outside of language. 
From their perspective, th<.! mass media do not merely construct a public 
reality, they also construct themselves into it. 
Finally, radical co11struclivists (Glasersfeld, 1991; Watzlawick, 1984), 
joining hands with second-ordl!r cyberneticians (Foerster, 1974; Mead, 
1968) and with biological cognitivists (Maturana & Varela, 1987), go be­
yond language determinism by insisting that internal and external reality 
is omnipresent but 1101 l.mowable without constructive participation by its 
observers. This seriously challenges the claim of privileged access to real­
ity as a basis of scientific authority, questions the use of this metaphysics 
by scientists to justify their role as intellectually superior observers of less 
sophisticated others, and criticizes the failure of researchers to reflect on 
their own cognitive participation in the phenomena they claim to de­
scribe. It radically doubts anyone's ability to provide objective accounts 
of the meanings messages have for others and thereby removes the 
ground of message-driven explanations. Radiql constructivists also em­
brace an important demand of feminist theory (e.g., 13elenky, Clinchy, 
Goldberger, & Tarule, 1986) to treat knou1ledge not as abstract and freely 
transmittable, but as embodied in a kuowerwho supplies his or her own 
terms for understanding, embracing both intellectual and emotional expe­
riences. This me:ms that no knowledge can exist outside knowers and 
that all facts have their factors, their mak<.!rs. This constructivism is radical 
because its conceptual framework grants no epistemological exceptions to 
scientific observers, constructivists included. 
Let me offer just one example of the kind of message-driven research 
whose unreflected claims I find increasingly offensive. Recently, I attend­
ed a workshop on the effects of tel<.!vision on children. A good part of it 
was devoted to childre11 ·s 1111derstandi11g. Proceeding from commitments 
to message-driven explanations, the researcher exposed children to se­
lected TV images and tested for what they could recall and correctly iden-
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tify. The findings of these experiml!nts were graphed and presented as 
showing how children's understanding improvl!d with age. A construc­
tivist critic might ask how and whose understanding is being articulated 
here: Clearly, the commitment to me�sage-driven explanations was the 
researcher's, not the children's. What counted as messages (what the TV 
images depicted) was decided by the reseurcher, not by the children. And 
although children live, at least in my exp<.!rience, in a very imaginative, 
fantastically rich, und certainly more varied world than adults do, the re­
searcher allowed as data only what he could cast into the categories of 
his own operationalized understanding. The children's did not matter. 
The researcher observed no more than how well children's (unobserved) 
understanding conformed to his well articulated expectations of what 
children should see or do if they were more like him and less like the 
children they were. I le acted as the self-appointed agent of an objective, 
shared, and adult world in which and to which children are expected to 
adjust, and explored no more than his own preco11ceptio11s, using chil­
drl!n, much as they are used in society-as convenient props. Message­
driven studies obviously disrespect otbers' tmderstanding. The claim to 
have studied children's understanding is not sustainable in the face of the 
apparent intellectual imperialism. 
One alternative to the above is the anthropologist Wagner's (1981) con­
ception of culture. [n the minds of objectivist!-i, culture usually ends up 
being a causal agent of overwhelming power. For Wagner it becomes the 
anthropologists' way of explaining their encounters wi_th people other 
than their own. Respecting, yet not grasping, the emergence of otherness 
in conversation, feeling the loss of certainties that everyday communica­
tion does afford, experiencing breakdown in the taken-for-grantedness of 
common sense, leads the analyst to invent and the interlocutors to co­
construct something both can live with. For reflexive anthropologists, this 
entails reinventing tbeir own c11/ture. Applied to the research example, 
Wagner might suggest listening to the children's stories with wonder and 
trying co make sense of why they tell us, if they do, what they see in 
terms of our understanding of their understanding of us. [n such a reflex­
ive loop, we might learn at le:.p;t to appreciate children's ways of seeing. 
We might also come to understand something about our own understand­
ing of, for instance, how constrained we have allowed ourselves to be­
come. 
[n the abovt:, r sec a new convergence of natural language philosophy, 
ethnography and cognitivism in linguistics, social and radical construc­
tivism, second-order cybernetics, reflexive sociology, and the above men� 
tioned responses to the failures of message-driven explanations (not just 
in mass communication), to which one might add efforts to understand 
the new interactive media (computer interfaces, hyper-media, virtual real­
ity) that have so far defied traditional theorizing. The epistemology of this 
new constructivism calls into question whether we could have communi­
cated the way we said we did. 
•17
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can distinguish pseudo-events from real ones. Tuchman 0974) considers 
news as constructed by the way the mass media are organized, and Gitlin 
0979) demonstrates how hegemonic processes account for TV entertain­
ment. Efforts to deconstruct social phenomena by showing how real so­
cial institutions, hegemonic forces, and power structure� are responsible 
for them belong here as well. This approach-some call it trivial con­
structivism-is unable to take institutions, structures of domination, ide­
ologies, and so forth, including the reality referred to in explaining these 
phenomena, as the analysts' constructions. 
The second group, the social constructionists, tie themselves to the 
later Wittgenstein and subsequent natural language philosophers by argu­
ing that all social phenomena can be explained by reference to language. 
Foucault (e.g., 1989) exemplifies a grand semiotic version of this view. 
Gergen (198;), his collaborators, and several discourse analysts-few of 
which build on Foucault's work-have shown how persons, emotions, 
gender, (self-)identity, taboos, and so forth are constructed and negotiat­
ed in language. They see no need to refer to facts outside of language. 
From their perspective, the mass media do not merely construct a public 
reality, they also construct themselves into it. 
Finally, radical constructivists (Glasersfeld, 1991; Watzlawick, 1984), 
joining hands with second-order cybcrneticians (Foerster, 1974; Mead, 
1968) and with biological cognitivists (Maturana & Varela, 1987), go be­
yond language determinism by insisting that internal and external reality 
is omnipresent but not k11owahle wit bout constructive participatio11 by its 
observers. This seriously challenges the claim of privileged access to real­
ity as a basis of scientific authority, questions the use of this metaphysics 
by scientists to justify their role as intellectually superior observers of less 
sophisticated others, and criticizes the failure of researchers to reflect on 
their own cognitive participation in the phenomena they claim to de­
scribe. It radically doubts anyone's ability to provide objective accounts 
of the meanings messages have for others and thereby removes the 
ground of message-driven explanations. Radiql constructivists also em­
brace an important demand of feminist theory (e.g., Belenky, Clinchy, 
Goldberger, & Tarule, 1986) to treat knowledge not as abstract and freely 
transmittable, but as embodied in a knower who supplies his or her own 
terms for understanding, embracing both intellectual and emotional expe­
riences. This means that no knowledge can exist outside knowers and 
that all facts have their factors, their makers. This constructivism is radical 
because its conceptual framework grants 110 epistemological exceptions to 
scientific observers, constructivists included. 
Let me offer just one example of the kind of message-driven research 
whose unreflected claims I find increasingly offensive. Recently, I attend­
ed a workshop on the effects of television on children. A good part of it 
was devoted to cbildren 's 1111derstmuli11g. Proceeding from commitments 
to message-driven explanations, the researcher exposed children to se­
lected TV images and tested for what they could recall and correctly iden-
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tify. The findings of these experiments were graphed and presented as 
showing how children's understanding improved with age. A construc­
tivist critic might ask how and whose understanding is being articulated 
here: Clearly, the commitment to me�sage-driven explanations was the 
researcher's, not the children's. What counted as messages (what the TV 
images depicted) was decided by the researcher, not by the children. And 
although children live, at least in my experience, in a very imaginative, 
fantastically rich, and certainly more varied world than adults do, the re­
searcher allowed as data only what he could cast into the categories of 
his own operationalized understanding. The children's did not matter. 
The researcher observed no more than how well children's (unobserved) 
understanding conformed to his well articulated expectations of what 
children should sec or do if they were more like him and less like the 
children they were. He acted as the self-appointed agent of an objective, 
shared, and adult world in which and to which children are expected to 
adjust, and explored no more than his own preco11ceptio11s, using chil­
dren, much as they are used in society-as convenient props. Message­
driven studies obviously disrespect others' understanding. The claim to 
have studied children's understanding is not sustainable in the face of the 
apparent intellectual imperialism. 
One alternative to the above is the anthropologist Wagner's 0981) con­
ception of culture. In the minds of objectivists, culture usually ends up 
being a causal agent of overwhelming power. For Wagner it becomes the 
anthropologists' way of explaining their encounters wiJh people other 
than their own. Respecting, yet not grasping, the emergence of otherness 
in conversation, feeling the loss of certainties that everyday communica­
tion does afford, experiencing breakdown in the taken-for-grantedness of 
common sense, leads the analyst to invent and the interlocutors to co­
construct something both can live with. For reflexive anthropologists, this 
entails reinve11ti11g tbeir own culture. Applied to the research example, 
Wagner might suggest listening to the children's stories with wonder and 
trying to make sense of why they tell us, if they do, what they see in 
terms of our understanding of their understanding of us. In such a reflex­
ive loop, we might learn at le�st to appreciate children's ways of seeing. 
We might also come to understand something about our own understand­
ing of, for instance, how constrained we have allowed ourselves to be­
come. 
In the above, I see a new convergence of natural language philosophy, 
ethnography and cognitivism in linguistics, social and radical construc­
tivism, second-order cybernetics, reflexive sociology, and the above men­
tioned responses to the failures of message-driven explanations (not just 
in mass communication), to which one might add efforts to understand 
the new interactive media (computer interfaces, hyper-media, virtual real­
ity) that have so far defied traditional theorizing. The epistemology of this 
new constructivism calls into question whether we could have communi­
cated the way we said we did. 
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Consider the rather sketchy history of communication research, its fail­
ings and the emergence of alternative paths, that I constructed as a st01y. 
It began with familiar but simple-minded accounts of how messages drive 
humans into compliance. But in its unfolding it is obvious that this simple 
beginning contradicts tbe ve,y experience of constructing, commzmicat­
ing, and listening to (or reading) it. Here, our story confronts its own re­
ality, which resides in its present telling. It suggests that the reality we 
sought to approximate by our scientific accounts always was of our own 
making, and it now calls on us to bring into focus the very communica­
tion practices we use in inquiring and writing about communication. 
To me, this realization marks a bifurcation point for communication re­
search. I don't anticipate that message-driven communication research 
will disappear. People in positions of authority are all too eager to em­
brace deterministic reality constructions that can offer them the prospect 
of forcing predictability and controllability onto others. Witness the use of 
message-driven vocabulary in the mass media, politics, education, adver­
tising, public relations, and management. Communication researchers can 
withdraw into this comfortable niche where message-driven explanations 
are enforced and the handmaidens of manipulatory interests are reward­
ed. This would surely be the end of our story. 
Becoming aware of the reality in telling our story of communication is a 
way of getting out of the trap of message-driven explanations. But it also 
means accepting the notion that reality is a social invention. Surely, we 
could not otherwise explain the experience that Reality Jsn 'I Wbat It Used 
to Be (Anderson, 1990) and how our constructions of communication 
could be evolving, as they do, in the very process of inquiring and com­
municating about them. The revolution that this new understanding of re­
ality can set in motion could be of a Copernican magnitude. However, 
while Copernicus's theory challenged only the location of the center of 
the then known astronomical universe and left the hierarchical organiza­
tion of social and religious life and the objectivist construction of the uni­
verse pretty much intact, the epistemology of this new constructivism 
challenges the privileged role of disembodied knowledge and reveals its 
complicity in the emergence of hierarchical forms of social and political 
authority and its attendant requirement of submission. 
Constructability of and in a Virtuous Future 
I am suggesting that the strands of scholarship mentioned above could be 
woven into a radically new and virtuous syntbesis, seeing humans first �1s 
cognitively autonomous beings; second, as reflexive practitioners of com­
munication with others (and this includes social scientists in the process 
of their inquiries); and third, as morally responsible interveners in, if not 
creacors of, the very social realities in which they end up living. To em­
brace this new epistemology, let me end this essay by suggesting that 
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communication scholars recognize the social constructibility of reality, 
with all of its consequences, and make commitments on each of these 
three points. 
First, the commitment to respect th� cognitive awouomyof those ob­
served and theorized. This presupposes the recognition that language, 
communication, indeed all social pbenomena exist only in the knowledge 
their participants have of them. Specifically, there can be no scientific or 
everyday understanding of human communication without an under­
standing of the understanding of those involved in communication. Story­
tellers can attest to this. Scientists know it when writing for their peers. I 
am merely suggesting that we grant those we seek to theorize like abili­
ties of understanding. In contrast, message-driven explanations equate 
scientiscs' understanding with objective truth and therefore cannot re­
spect others' understanding of communication, unless they all agree. Nor 
can they acknowledge that anyone's understanding of communication is 
reflexively embedded in communicating about it. Cognitive autonomy re­
sides in the (my) fact chat (a) individuals cannot be forced or caused to 
understand something as intended, as it exists, or as it should be; (b) that 
nobody can directly observe someone else's underscanding; (c) that all in­
dividual accions are dedicated to preserve individual understanding, and 
Cd) that understanding is never final, even in the absence of external stim­
ulation. 
Respecting this autonomy prevents abstract and disembodied commu­
nication tbeory constructions and encourages explanations of communi­
cation phenomena (and of other social constructions) from the bottom 
up, from the knowledge and practices embodied in its participants. This 
contrasts with top-down explanations that attribute determining forces to 
someone else's (usually the observing scientists') super-individual con­
structions-for example, ideologies, hegemonic forces, cultural deter­
minisms, rules, or objective meanings. Respecting this autonomy also 
means abandoning tbe idea of creating general tbeories witbout obtain­
ing, as far as possible, tbe consent of tbose tbeorized. If people do hold 
different theories of communication and practice them with each other, a 
general theory of communication may not do justice to either. Indeed, 
there are plenty of eminently practical folk theories people live by-for 
instance, communication as imparting knowledge, as maintaining or cre­
ating relationships, as domination or control, as healing wounds, as 
dance, and so forth. For inquiries in communication, I prefer a conversa­
tion metaphor because it respects the cognitive autonomy of others (Krip­
pendorff, in press, a). 
Second, communication scholars should commit themselves to reflexive 
tbeory1 constructio11s by means of which they can enter others' under­
standing into their own understanding. As understanding is never fin­
ished, this means that a reflexive reality cannot remain fixed either. It is 
continually created, tried out and tested each time it is being talked 
about. This is so for social scientists, whose analytical categories, origi-
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sought to approximate by our scientific accounts always was of our own 
making, and it now calls on us to bring into focus the very communica­
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brace deterministic reality constructions that can offer them the prospect 
of forcing predictability and controllability onto others. Witness the use of 
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withdraw into this comfortable niche where message-driven explanations 
are enforced and the handmaidens of manipulatory interests are reward­
ed. This would surely be the end of our story. 
Becoming aware of the reality in telling our story of communication is a 
way of getting out of the trap of message-driven explanations. But it also 
means accepting the notion that reality is a social invention. Surely, we 
could not otherwise explain the experience that Reality Jsn 'I \flhat It Used 
to Be (Anderson, 1990) and how our constructions of communication 
could be evolving, as they do, in the very process of inquiring and com­
municating about them. The revolution that this new understanding of re­
ality can set in motion could be of a Copernican magnitude. However, 
while Copernicus's theory challenged only the location of the center of 
the then known astronomical universe and left the hierarchical organiza­
tion of social and religious life and the objectivist construction of the uni­
verse pretty much intact, the epistemology of this new constructivism 
challenges the privileged role of disembodied knowledge and reveals its 
complicity in the emergence of hierarchical forms of social and political 
authority and its attendant requirement of submission. 
Constructability of and in a Virtuous Future 
I am suggesting that the strands of scholarship mentioned above could be 
woven into a radically new and virtuous synthesis, seeing humans first as 
cognitively autonomous beings; second, as reflexive practitioners of com­
munication with others (and this includes social scientists in the process 
of their inquiries); and third, as morally responsible interveners in, if not 
creators of, the very social realities in which they end up living. To em­
brace this new epistemology, let me end this essay by suggesting that 
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communication scholars recognize the social constructibility of reality, 
with all of its consequences, and make commitments on each of these 
three points. 
First, the commitment to respect th� cognitive autonomy of those ob­
served and theorized. This presupposes the recognition that language, 
communication, indeed all social pbe11omena exist only in the knowledge 
their participants have of them. Specifically, there can be no scientific or 
everyday understanding of human communication without an under­
standing of the understanding of those involved in communication. Story­
tellers can attest to this. Scientists know it when writing for their peers. I 
am merely suggesting that we grant those we seek to theorize like abili­
ties of understanding. In contrast, message-driven explanations equate 
scientists' understanding with objective truth and therefore cannot re­
spect others' understanding of communication, unless they all agree. Nor 
can they acknowledge that anyone's understanding of communication is 
reflexively embedded in communicating about it. Cognitive autonomy re­
sides in the (my) fact that (a) individuals cannot be forced or caused to 
understand something as intended, as it exist'>, or as it should be; (b) that 
nobody can directly observe someone else's understanding; (c) that all in­
dividual actions are dedicated to preserve individual understanding, and 
(d) that understanding is never final, even in the absence of external stim­
ulation.
Respecting this autonomy prevents abstract and disembodied commu-
11icatio11 theory constructions and encourages explanations of communi­
cation phenomena (and of other social constructions) from the bottom 
up, from the knowledge and practices embodied in its participants. This 
contrasts with top-down explanations that attribute determining forces to 
someone else's (usually the observing scientists') super-individual con­
structions-for example, ideologies, hegemonic forces, cultural deter­
minisms, rules, or objective meanings. Respecting this autonomy also 
means abandoning the idea of creating general tbeories without obtai11-
i11g, as far as possible, tbe co11se111 of those tbeorized. If people do hold 
different theories of communication and practice them with each other, a 
general theory of communication may not do justice to either. Indeed, 
there are plenty of eminently practical folk theories people live by-for 
instance, communication as imparting knowledge, as maintaining or cre­
ating relationships, as domination or control, as healing wounds, as 
dance, and so forth. For inquiries in communication, I prefer a conversa­
tion metaphor because it respects the cognitive autonomy of others (Krip­
pendorff, in press, a). 
Second, communication scholars should commit themselves to reflexive 
tbeo1J' co11struclio11s by means of which they can enter others' under­
standing into their own understanding. As understanding is never fin­
ished, this means that a reflexive reality cannot remain fixed either. It is 
continually created, tried out and tested each time it is being talked 
about. This is so for social scientists, whose analytical categories, origi-
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nally invented for mere analytical purposes, can become real (Giddens, 
1991, pp. 40-41); for politicians, whose campaign promises can change 
political practices; for engineers, whose inventions keep technology on 
the move; and so it is in the everyday life of communication. All social 
theories must also be communicable, at least among scientific peers, and 
may reach and affect those theorized therein. Neither can they escape the 
self-reference this entails, nor can their stability be assured in being com­
municated. Denying the reflexive nature of human communication (theo­
ry) sets communication researchers apart from their subjects and creates 
reality constructions that aid technologies and can support oppressive so­
cial structures. Reflexivity is perhaps the most outstanding feature of 
human communication. I have proposed (Krippendorff, in press, b) that 
human communication scholarship redefine itself in terms of the dis­
course that embraces itself. 
Third, we need a commitment to what one might call a distributive
ethics for social inquiry. In the preceding, I claimed that knowledge, es­
pecially social scientific knowledge-communication theory, for exam­
ple-can hardly be prevented from entering the phenomena it addresses. 
Whether it is intended to be critical or merely descriptive, it can delegit­
imize what exists or contribute new social constructions. The changes 
thus brought forth encourage the emergence of radically distributed reali­
ties, a multi verse of reflexive constructions, that no general theory can 
capture. I believe that the increased awareness of our role in the socially 
(and hence communicationally) constructed, distributed, and emerging 
nature of contemporary realities has brought us, as social scientists, to a 
point where truth is secondary to the responsibilities we bear for our con­
structions. To be consistent with this new multiverse means to distribute 
this responsibility. I made the methodological proposal to invite those af­
fected to participate in the construction of communication theories con­
cerning them (Krippendorff, in press, a). Living such an ethics may not be 
easy. However, practical difficulties should not deter us from developing 
methodologies that assure respect for those theorized. 
No story of our message-driven past can tell us what the future has in 
store. But its present telling demonstrates the constructed nature of our 
field, and the awareness of this demonstration affirms our role in invent­
ing and reconstructing the social realities we work in. If this is so, we 
might as well take the poetic licence to construct, and put into a story, the 
most desirable realities we can imagine. Understanding this understand­
ing could be a moment of liberation. 
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Verbing Communication: Mandate for 
Disciplinary Inven�ion 
by Brenda Dervin, Ohio State University 
Most of the polarities that divide our field-universalist vs. contextual 
theories, administrative vs. critical research, qualitative vs. quantitative 
approaches, the micro vs. the macro, the theoretic vs. the applied, femi­
nist vs. nonfeminist-are symptoms, not the disease. They are shallow in­
dicators of something more fundamental. Because that which is funda­
mental eludes us, we see both tolerance (a comfortable acceptance of 
theoretical pluralism) and dissent (ideological and methodological con­
tests) everywhere. It is as if we �ire all studying a very large elephant. 
Without addressing the question directly, we seem to assume that we are 
studying the same elephant, while comfortably relegating ourselves to
our own parts. But every once in a while we bump into each other. 
Our contradictions are used both as a measure of our tolerance (after 
all, she does xwhile I do y) and a measure of our dissent (but she is 
doing x the wrong way, or her work has these negative consequences). 
While caught in these ricochets between tolerance and dissent, we can 
pontificate on why media effects remain a black box or why our research 
seems irrelevant to practice or why disciplinary status eludes us. It's be­
cause "they• use the wrong methodology, wrong theoretic perspective, 
wrong ideology, wrong ... They should become more like "us." What we 
have is dissent mythologized as tolerance. 
At root here is the issue of difference-both the differences. between 
different sectors of our field and the differences that are at the heart of 
what we study-the differences that characterize human beings, their 
symbolic lives, and their symbolic products. I would propose that it is 
how we treat the latter differences that confounds our own differences. 
Our field and the social sciences in general have for the most part han 9 
died difference in ways that are not fundamental. Because of this, our 
theories are weak and we end up attending with much energy to artificial, 
symptomatic differences, squabbling over turf and status. We end up try-
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